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Abstract: As of 1987, the US’s Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) has imposed mandatory minimum
sentences for drug traffickers based on the quantity of the drug involved irrespective of purity.
Using the STRIDE dataset and a differences-in-differences approach, I find that this led to
increases in cocaine and heroin purity of 52 per cent and 27 per cent respectively. It also affected
the distribution of purity around its mean. Using data on emergency room visits, I show that
changes in the distribution of purity had significant impacts on such visits. These results provide




lthough drug use has long been viewed as a problem, worries continue to
mount as the potency of illicit substances rises. As shown in Figure 1, the
average purity of street-level cocaine has increased. Figure 2 shows the same
for heroin. Concurrent with this, the number of emergency room (ER) visits
mentioning these drugs has increased. In addition Figures 1 and 2 show that
429
*University College Dublin, Email: ronbdavies@gmail.com. 
I thank Jonathan Caulkins, Beth Freeborn, Steven Levitt, Robin McKnight, Peter Reuter, Glen
Waddell, Aaron Yelowitz, an anonymous referee and seminar participants at Oregon State
University for helpful comments. I also thank Dhaval Dave for graciously providing me with some
of my data and Sonja Anthone for research assistance. All errors are my own responsibility.
02 Davies_ESRI Vol 41-4  14/12/2010  11:16  Page 429430 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
Figure 1: Cocaine Purity and ER Mentions
Figure 2: Heroin Purity and ER Mentions
Notes: For observations of 1 gram or less. Purity ranges from 0 to 10 for easier
reading.
Notes: For observations of 1 gram or less. Purity ranges from 0 to 1.
02 Davies_ESRI Vol 41-4  14/12/2010  11:16  Page 430the number of ER mentions per 100,000 people mentioning cocaine or heroin
doubled during the 1990s. This suggests that there may be a causal link in
which more powerful drugs increase the likelihood of accidental overdose.1
In response to this concern, this paper demonstrates that part of the
increase in cocaine and heroin purity is due to the 1986 passage of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act (ADAA). This law introduced federal mandatory minimum
(MM) sentences based on the quantity of drugs seized, regardless of their
purity.2 To do this, I utilise data from 1977 to 2001 from the Drug Enforcement
Agency’s (DEA) System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence
(STRIDE) database. This dataset contains information collected by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the DEA, including purity. For
cocaine, the federal MM is associated with a 52 per cent increase in purity. For
heroin, the associated increase is 27 per cent. It is important to note that this
increase is significantly smaller in states that had their own comparable laws
prior to the federal law. This is easily seen in Figure 3 where, especially for
cocaine, there is a marked change in purity immediately following the ADAA.
In addition to the increase in average purity, I find that the federal MM also
lowered cocaine purity’s coefficient of variation (CV) and skewness. 
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1 Examples of such claims include Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) (2005) and Hall and Darke
(1997).
2 In contrast, Irish MMs, initially entered into force in 1999, are imposed on the value of the drugs
with the current penalty of at least ten years when the value is more than €12,700 (Cassin and
O’Mahony, 2006).
Figure 3: Average Drug Purity Depending on State Mandatory Minimums
Note: For observations of 1 gram or less. Purity ranges from 0 to 100.
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relationship between purity and ER mentions. For both cocaine and heroin, I
find that higher purity, lower CV, and higher skewness is generally linked to
fewer ER mentions. Similar results are found for specific outcomes, including
death and overdose rates. This suggests that uncertainty in drug markets
plays a significant role in the health outcomes of use. This lends support to the
concern expressed by Cassin and O’Mahony (2006) that Irish drug law
engenders instability in the market, thereby creating uncertainty leading to
increased overdoses. For the US case, however, I estimate that the ADAA
reduced the extent of negative health outcomes because of the increase in
purity and the reduction in the CV. 
These changes brought about by the ADAA are linked to their impact on
the penalties associated with drug trafficking. Chief among these was the
introduction of federal MMs.3 These MMs set forth penalties that the federal
judge must impose upon conviction (although both US and Irish law allow for
limited exceptions).4 The data suggest that penalties have indeed risen. Trial
defendants facing MMs are two and a half times likely to be convicted than
those who did not face MMs (Jaffe, 1995).5 Furthermore, between 1986 and
1991 the average federal prison sentence for a drug offence rose from 62 to 86
months (Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), 1995).6 As Table 1 shows, the
severity of the MM is increasing in the amount of the drug that is involved.
What is surprising, however, is that the sentence is based on the total weight
of what is captured, not on the “pure” weight, that is, the amount of the drug
that is left after netting out dilutants and adulterating substances. By
enforcing MMs based upon the total weight rather than the pure weight, this
increases the cost of delivering a given quantity of drugs. The predicted
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3 These laws took effect in 1987 and include the United States Code Section 21 Subsections 841,
844, and 960, which govern the manufacture, distribution, possession, and import/export
penalties for controlled substances. For details and discussion of this Act, see Saphos, et al. (1987).
In addition to federal mandatory minimums, many states have similar schemes that apply to
cases tried in their own courts. One of the best known, the so-called Rockefeller Drug Laws, were
enacted in New York in 1973.
4 US laws allow for two exceptions. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
allows non-violent first time offenders to receive reduced sentences (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2001). In addition, those offering “substantial assistance” to law enforcement can obtain reduced
sentences. According to the BJS (2001), this accounted for about 28 per cent of cases in 1999.
Ennis (2003) provides a legal analysis of exceptions used in Irish courts. A study of European drug
laws (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2009) finds that for Ireland
exceptions are the rule with only three of 55 convictions between 1999 and 2001 resulting in the
minimum ten year sentence. 
5 During 1999, 62 per cent of drug convictions were under MMs with over half receiving sentences
greater than 60 months (BJS, 2001).
6 In Ireland, where available data do not distinguish between traffickers and users, the average
sentence is 34 months (EMCDDA, 2009).
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consumers and producers would prefer to trade in smaller, purer amounts.
Although federal law only applies when tried in federal court (which tries a
minority of cases), given the severity of the penalties, one would still expect
dealers to respond. Further, one might expect dealers to respond the most in
states where penalties are initially low.
This is in fact borne out by the data. As Table 2 details, several states had
imposed their own state-level MMs prior to the federal law. As such, one might
expect that the increase in purity in response to the federal law would be
smaller in these states because dealers may have already shifted towards
higher purities in response to the state-level MMs. Table 3 reports the average
purity for drug observations of one gram or less both before and after 1987 as
well as depending on whether the state had its own MM. As can be seen in
Table 3 and Figure 3, this increase is indeed largest for states without their
own pre-existing MMs. This difference-in-differences approach helps to
alleviate the concern that the regression analysis is merely capturing a trend
in the overall data since this would require that the break in the trend differed
by state. Furthermore, for the estimated impact to solely reflect changes such
as the introduction of crack or a change in the type of dealers the DEA targets,
this too would have to be demarcated along state-level MM lines.
These changes in purity can lead to changes in the health outcomes of use.
Looking at the data from the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN)
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Table 1: Federal Mandatory Drug Sentences for First-time Offenders
Type of Drug Sentence for  Sentence for 
First Offence Second Offence
Powder Cocaine 500 grams 5 years 10 years
5 kilos 10 years 20 years
Crack Cocaine 5 grams 5 years 10 years
50 grams 10 years 20 years
Heroin 100 grams 5 years 10 years
1 kilo 10 years 20 years
LSD 1 gram 5 years 10 years
10 grams 10 years 20 years
Marijuana 100 plants or 100 kilos 5 years 10 years
1,000 plants or 1,000 kilos 10 years 20 years
Methamphetamine 5 grams 5 years 10 years
50 grams 10 years 20 years
PCP 10 grams 5 years 10 years
100 grams 10 years 20 years
Source: Anti-Drug Abuse Act (1986).
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of cocaine or heroin appears to move in conjunction with measures of the
distribution of purity. While one might expect users to condition consumption
on the average purity in their market, as suggested by Cassin and O’Mahony
(2006) other distributional changes that affect the uncertainty regarding
purity might be more difficult to respond to. As such, a higher CV or skewness
might either lead to more ER mentions due to a greater risk of consuming too
much or to fewer mentions if risk-averse users reduce use due to greater
uncertainty.
For both cocaine and heroin, I find that a higher CV increases ER
mentions. This is consistent with greater uncertainty increasing negative
health outcomes. On the other hand, higher skewness (i.e. a longer tail in the
higher purities) reduces ER mentions. This might arise if a greater chance of
consuming a very high purity deters use. Although its coefficient is less robust
(especially for heroin), higher average purity is also linked to fewer ER
mentions which might be attributable to higher purity implying fewer harmful
adulterants. Using another, heretofore unused database provided by the
DAWN, I find that the number of deaths, overdoses and unexpected reactions
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Table 2: State Mandatory Minimums for Repeat Drug Offenders
Alabama 1977 Indiana 1976 Nebraska 1977 Sth Carolina 1976
Alaska 1982 Iowa 1979 Nevada 1971 Sth Dakota 1989
Arizona 1978 Kansas —– New Hampshire 1969 Tennessee 1989
Arkansas 1971 Kentucky —– New Jersey 1987 Texas 1974
California 1977 Louisiana —– New Mexico —– Utah —–
Colorado 1992 Maine 1988 New York 1973 Vermont —–
Connecticut —– Maryland 2002 North Carolina 1994 Virginia 1992
Delaware 1987 Massachusetts 1987 North Dakota 1993 Washington —–
Florida 1973 Michigan 1978 Ohio 1996 Washington, 
Georgia 1994 Minnesota 1989 Oklahoma 1982 DC —–
Hawaii 1976 Mississippi 1977 Oregon —– West Virginia 1971
Idaho 1990 Missouri 1989 Pennsylvania 1988 Wisconsin —–
Illinois 2004 Montana 1993 Rhode Island 1988 Wyoming 1982
Table 3: Average Purities for Observations Under 1 Gram
Cocaine Heroin
Prior to  After  Prior to  After 
1987 1987 1987 1987
State MM instituted prior to 1987 26.75 33.53 14.11 27.92
No state MM 22.95
51.06 6.56 22.49
State MM instituted after 1987 35.50 33.75
02 Davies_ESRI Vol 41-4  14/12/2010  11:16  Page 434from heroin and cocaine use respond to changes in purity’s distribution in
ways comparable to ER mentions. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the
estimation methodology and the data. Section III contains the results
regarding the effect of MMs on drug purity, including the effect on the CV and
skewness. Section IV investigates the effect of purity changes on ER mentions
and outcomes. Section V concludes.
II  EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND DATA
To motivate my empirics, consider a simple model of a profit-maximising
drug dealer. Expected profits from dealing an amount Q of purity R are:
(1)
where  P(R, Q) is the price per gram, C(RQ) is the cost of producing (or
purchasing from another distributor) an amount Q with purity R, a is the
probability of being arrested and convicted, and J(Q) is the monetary cost of
being convicted of dealing a quantity Q. Assume that P12(R, Q) < 0. The
production cost C(R, Q) is an increasing convex function in both arguments
(with a positive cross-partial). The jail-time cost J(Q;  M) is an increasing
convex function of M, a term reflecting the degree of enforcement. One reason
for a rise in M is the imposition of MMs, i.e. they lead to an increase in the
legal penalty of dealing a given quantity regardless of the purity. The first






i.e. an increase in the penalties associated with a MM leads to an increase in
purity. On this issue, note the results of Caulkins and Padman (1993), who
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πe (Q,R)=P(R,Q)Q −C(R,Q) − aJ(Q ;M)
P1(R,Q)Q− C 1(R,Q) = 0
P2 (R,Q )Q+P(R,Q ) −C 2(R,Q ) −aJ Q (Q;M ) = 0
dR
dM =−
aJ QM P12Q+P 1 −C12 []
∆
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2> 0
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quantity. Using the STRIDE drug price data, they find that consumers pay
more for two grams with 30 per cent purity than for one gram with 60 per cent
purity. Thus, although drug markets may shift from quantity towards purity
due to MMs, they would not switch to an entirely pure product.
I turn now to my data. The unit of observation in my data is an individual
drug transaction. Specifically, I estimate the following specification:
(5)
where Purityi,s,t is the purity of transaction i which took place in state s in year
t. This is a function of state-specific fixed effects (Ss), state specific linear time
trends (Ts,t), transaction specific variables (Xi), the legal environment in state
s in year t (ManMins,t), state-invariant time-varying variables (Zt), other state-
specific time-varying variables (Ys,t), and the error term εi,s,t.7 As discussed by
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), potential serial correlation in
errors can yield to false rejections of differences-in-differences estimates.
Therefore, as they suggest, errors are clustered by state.
Information on a drug transaction comes from the DEA’s STRIDE
database, which contains information on cocaine and heroin transactions by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the DEA. Note a transaction can
either be a purchase or a seizure. For this study, I use data from 1977 to 2001
since information from ongoing investigations is withheld by the DEA
impacting the data after 2001.8,9 For each transaction, the date and location of
the transaction are logged as well as the quantity and purity of the drug
seized. In my estimates I use transactions for powder cocaine (HCl) and
hydrochloride salt heroin.10 In addition to the above information, if the
transaction was a purchase, the STRIDE data reports the price negotiated for
the given amount. Given the endogeneity of price and quantity in the model,
they were not used as controls.11 However, a dummy variable Purchase was
created that equals one when the transaction was a purchase. Following
Horowitz (2001) to focus on “street-level” transactions, quantity was used to
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Purity i,s,t =α 0+α 1Ss+α 2T s, t +α 3Xi +α 4ManMins,t+α 5Zt +α 6Ys, t+εi,s,t
7 Note that since I am using retail purity, I am assuming that either changes in import purity are
negligible or are sufficiently captured by the time trends.
8 My data were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, request number 02-0714-R.
9 In unreported results, I used sub-samples of the data including the ten and four years
surrounding 1987. This yielded similar sign patterns to the reported results, however, significance
declined .
10 The STRIDE data also includes information on crack and tar heroin, however, these were made
available to me. See Caulkins, et al. (2004) for discussion of trends in the crack market.
11 In unreported results, two price variables – the price per gram and the total transaction price
– were used just for the purchased sub-sample. Other unreported results used quantity despite
potential endogeneity. All of these yielded comparable results. 
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with missing information were deleted. International observations were
deleted, thus my sample is composed of observations from the fifty US states
plus Washington DC (all of which I refer to as “states”).12 Observations with
purities greater than 100 and/or quantities equal to zero were also deleted.13
This left 325,129 cocaine observations and 103,568 heroin observations. In
addition to these, the date was used to construct eleven month dummies.14
The legal environment variables are my variables of interest. In order to
use a differences-in-differences approach, there are four such variables. The
first is a dummy variable Federal MM which is equal to 1 for any observation
in 1987 or later (the year the law took effect) and zero otherwise. The second
is a dummy variable Prior State MM equal to 1 for any observation occurring
in a state enforcing its own MM instituted prior to 1987. The third interacts
these two thereby providing the difference in the effect of the federal law
between states with their own MMs by 1987 and those that did not. Since the
introduction of the federal law would likely have a smaller impact in states
with their own preexisting MMs, I anticipate a negative coefficient for the
interaction of the prior state and federal variables. Note, however, that I do
not necessarily expect it to have an equal but opposite coefficient from the
federal variable. Since a drug dealer can be arrested and convicted by either
federal or local authorities, it is still possible that the introduction of federal
MMs on top of state MMs led to an increase in purity. The fourth variable, Post
State MM is a dummy variable equal to one for any observation occurring in a
state with its own MM enacted after the federal law took effect.15 Similar to
the interaction term, I expect that the imposition of a state MM on top of the
federal one to have a negative effect on purity. Note that since the state
variables only equal one after a state begins enforcing its own law and the
interaction and Post State MM variables do not activate until after 1987, these
are not perfectly correlated with the state fixed effects.
These state-level MM variables were created from information collected
through communication with state attorney general offices and law
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12 As noted below, I find no impact of US mandatory minimums on the purity of cocaine or heroin
in the international data. This suggests that the change in purity is indeed US specific and is
therefore unlikely the result of a change in world drug markets.
13 A sizable number of observations report zero purity. This could be an actual zero purity or a
transaction where no purity analysis was performed (potentially due to a quantity too small to
perform the analysis). Estimates excluding these transactions found similar results. 
14 December was the omitted month. Note that these month dummies net out the year-invariant
average difference across months, i.e. seasonal variation, and thus do not preclude the use of year-
varying variables.
15 Note that since all of these state laws are enacted no earlier than 1987, interacting this with
Federal MM would yield the same variable.
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Bureau of Justice Assistance (1996). It is important to note that these state
MMs are not always limited to drug offences but that all do indeed apply to
drug dealers. A well-known example of this is California’s “three strikes” law
in which third time felony offenders face a MM.16 Thus, some states do not
have MMs for the initial offence, but do for the second or third offence. In
addition, some states had MMs for very specific offences such as selling drugs
within 1,000 feet of a school or for dealers in possession of a handgun. Since
these more specific types of laws do not correspond as well to the federal MMs
as states’ repeat offender laws do, I do not count these. Therefore, the state
MM variables indicate the existence of a law under which a repeat, non-violent
drug trafficker would face a MM, making this measure of state laws as close a
counterpart as possible to the federal law.17 In addition to these, I include a
number of state-level variables to control for legal enforcement, demographic,
and income effects. The Data Appendix describes these in detail and also
includes summary statistics in Table A1.
Within the data, there are two concerns. First, it may be that the
observations represent a biased sample if the dealers targeted by the DEA are
not representative of average dealers.18 In the context of this study, if the DEA
targets high-purity dealers then the average purity might be higher here than
in (unavailable) representative data. This indicates the need to control for
unobserved factors by using state-specific fixed effects. However, when asking
whether the federal MM increased purity in a differences-in-differences
specifica  tion, to find the results below it would be necessary for the DEA
change its targeting towards even higher-purity dealers in states without
their own MMs at around the same time the federal law took effect. Since
there is no documentation to support such a claim, my results give the best
indication of the effect of the federal law given the constraints of the available
data. 
Second, there is the possibility that state-level MMs may depend on purity,
i.e. states with higher purities may be more likely to form their own MMs. The
possibility of such an endogeneity bias is unlikely in this study for two
reasons. First, the unit of observation is a single transaction and such laws are
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16 Some states also have mandatory minimums specific for violent offenders or sex offenders.
Since this differs significantly from the federal law, I do not count this as a drug offence
mandatory minimum.
17 While there is a great deal of variation across states in terms of the number of offences needed
to trigger the MM and the severity of the punishment it entails, the complexity and degree of
heterogeneity makes it impossible to construct a meaningful variable exploiting these details.
Furthermore, several states changed the severity of the penalty. Since I am unable to obtain
detailed information on the dates of these revisions, I use this simple dummy variable approach.
18 Horowitz (2001) uses this argument to critique the STRIDE’s price data.
02 Davies_ESRI Vol 41-4  14/12/2010  11:16  Page 438not written as the result of a single transaction. Second, given the time lag to
draft and pass such legislation, if anything the existence of a state MM would
depend on purity several years before it is initially implemented (something
that itself is rejected in unreported results).19 Nevertheless, as a final
safeguard, state fixed effects and state specific time trends are included to
filter out the state-specific averages and trends.
III  THE IMPACT OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS ON PURITY
Table 4 reports OLS estimates of the impact of MMs on cocaine purity
(columns 1-3) and heroin purity (columns 4-6).20 In columns 1 and 4, the full
sample is used. In columns 2, 3, 4 and 5, I restrict the data to those
observations with quantities less than or equal to one gram. In columns 3 and
6, I use year dummies. Note that the year dummies absorb the Federal MM
variables. 
As columns 1 and 2 show, Federal MM is positive and highly significant for
cocaine. For the full sample, the estimated coefficient is 25.4. When compared
to the average purity of the sample of 32 per cent, this implies a 79 per cent
increase in purity after the federal MMs took effect. Note that the magnitude
of this change is roughly equal to the increase in average purity during the
three years surrounding the implementation of the federal MMs. In the
“street-level” cocaine sample, the estimated impact is 21.4 percentage points.
Compared to the purity average of 41.3 in this sample, the federal MM
increased the purity by about 52 per cent. As predicted, the total impact of the
federal law is smaller in states that had their own pre-existing MMs where it
is just over half as large as in states without their own MMs. Looking at
Figure 3, this result is expected. In each case I reject the null that these two
effects offset one another, indicating that there was a significant increase in
purity even if a state had its own pre-existing MM.
Looking at the estimated impact of the state-level MMs themselves, the
prior state MMs are linked to increase purity although only when using the
full sample. This suggests that state laws had an impact only for relatively
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19 When estimating a Probit model on whether a state has its own MM as a function of lagged
purity of up to five years along with the other state-level controls, excepting the one year lag in
cocaine, lagged purity was never significant. Since t is extremely unlikely that states could
institute a law so swiftly (and that previous year purities do not matter at all), this further
alleviates concerns of endogeneity.
20 Numerous alternative specifications were used, including a post-1985 dummy variable, Tobit,
the log of purity, quantity and/or price as control variables, excluding zero purities, sub-samples
only using states with 50 or more observations per year, and the full sample. All of these yielded
similar qualitative results and are available on request. 
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Table 4: The Impact of Mandatory Minimums on Purity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cocaine Heroin
All  1 Gram  1 Gram,  All  1 Gram   1 Gram,
Quantities Year FE Quantities Year FE
Federal MM 25.437*** 21.483*** 8.739*** 5.355***
(3.744) (4.171) (2.146) (1.634)  
Prior State MM –9.950** –9.398** –5.233** –2.213     
*Federal MM (3.766) (4.631) (2.434) (2.414)
Prior State MM 10.100*** 2.009 0.617 –4.556** –4.23*** –4.036*
(3.288) (5.664) (5.324) (1.894) (1.374) (2.063)
Post State MM –4.813** –0.281 0.581 3.248 7.592* 9.016***
Other controls:
Agents (2.089) (3.250) (3.296) (2.612) (3.963) (3.128)
–0.010*** –0.005* –0.030*** –0.007*** –0.005** –0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
Budget –7.08e-8* –1.05e-7* 6.38e-07*** –8.4e-8*** –4.2e-8* 4.26e-08
(3.54e-08) (5.30e-08) (1.46e-07) (2.41e-8) (2.18e-8) (1.53e-7)
Crime Index 8.05e-11 1.6e-10*** 4.11e-11 8.61e-11* 2e-10*** 2e-10***
(6.63e-11) (5.30e-08) (8.36e-11) (4.9e-11) (4.4e-11) (6e-11)
Total Obs 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* –0.0003 –0.002** –0.005**
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
State Intensity 65.253*** 52.349*** 30.918* 10.988 4.803 19.771*
(17.469) (15.974) (15.517) (9.935) (7.526) (11.400)
Population –1.10e-15 –6.4e-15* –5.74e-15 1.65e-15 –6e-15*** –8e-15***
(3.37e-15) (3.17e-15) (3.72e-15) (2e-15) (1.7e-15) (2.3e-15)
GSP –3.33e-11 3.57e-11 1.38e-11 –5e-11*** 2.75e-11 1.48e-11
(3.41e-11) (3.50e-11) (3.14e-11) (1.7e-11) (3e-11) (2.9e-11)
Income 5.07e-10 –3.89e-11 5.45e-10 1.83e-9** 9.89e-11 1.47e-10
(6.52e-10) (6.45e-10) (8.91e-10) (8.9e-10) (5.8e-10) (6.4e-10)
Poverty Rate 0.268 –0.276** –0.905*** 0.178 –0.141 –0.353**
(0.168) (0.128) (0.172) (0.233) (0.178) (0.174)
Unemp. Rate 0.322 0.626** 0.487 0.436 0.531 1.179***
(0.282) (0.247) (0.397) (0.389) (0.408) (0.405)
% Male –1.376*** –0.439 0.562 –0.048 0.714** 0.767**
(0.355) (0.271) (0.457) (0.394) (0.274) (0.328)
% Female  –0.576*** –0.089 0.566** –0.548*** –0.109 0.071
Household (0.165) (0.196) (0.228) (0.166) (0.150) (0.134)
% Hispanic  1.030*** 1.950*** 1.843** 0.650** 0.899** 0.712
(0.344) (0.681) (0.702) (0.315) (0.370) (0.484)
% Black  –0.781** –1.067*** –0.802** 0.012 0.034 –0.190
(0.296) (0.284) (0.303) (0.370) (0.269) (0.317)
% Other 0.368 0.998 0.688 0.686* 1.070** 0.877*
Nonwhite (0.546) (0.643) (0.578) (0.359) (0.494) (0.506)
% Aged 0-17 1.374*** 1.826*** 0.723 0.551 –0.051 –0.539
(0.439) (0.420) (0.559) (0.448) (0.364) (0.554)
02 Davies_ESRI Vol 41-4  14/12/2010  11:16  Page 440large quantities of cocaine. State MMs enacted after 1987, however, are
associated with lower purity. Since these laws then took effect after the federal
ones, as with the interacted term discussed above, this may signal a smaller
marginal impact of the federal MM relative to these states’ state-specific
means. Turning to column 3, note that when using year dummies, the state
MMs have no effect.21 This is important because it provides further evidence
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Table 4: The Impact of Mandatory Minimums on Purity (contd.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cocaine Heroin
All  1 Gram  1 Gram,  All  1 Gram   1 Gram,
Quantities Year FE Quantities Year FE
% Aged 18-24 0.243 0.619* 0.481 –0.881 –1.004 –1.92***
(0.549) (0.350) (0.466) (0.592) (0.648) (0.559)
% Aged 25-66 1.008*** 0.936** –0.138 0.271 0.245 –0.122
(0.373) (0.466) (0.518) (0.331) (0.424) (0.485)
% High School 1.123*** 0.629 –0.274 0.731** –0.041 –0.225
(0.307) (0.377) (0.516) (0.297) (0.303) (0.388)
% Some College 1.003** 0.671 –0.147 1.343*** 0.601 0.415
(0.405) (0.537) (0.497) (0.469) (0.429) (0.379)
% College  0.785* 0.767 –0.238 1.878*** 0.984** 0.302
(0.442) (0.473) (0.549) (0.465) (0.427) (0.887)
% Post-graduate 0.567 0.222 0.309 0.983* 0.197 0.221
(0.492) (0.554) (0.600) (0.543) (0.547) (0.647)
Purchase 5.393*** 22.870*** 22.934*** –3.688* 7.021** 7.126**
(0.793) (4.615) (4.619) (1.857) (2.682) (2.700)
Constant –3.001 –34.433 36.145 –78.874 –12.508 33.108
(55.337) (57.542) (82.877) (50.836) (44.383) (47.091)
Observations 325,129 104,813 104,813 103,568 41,802 41,802
R-squared 0.109 0.240 0.243 0.419 0.237 0.242
H0: Federal MM + 
Prior State MM*
Fed. MM = 0 32.01*** 10.51*** – 2.36 2.62 –
H0: Prior State 
MM = Post 
State MM  13.04*** 0.12 0.0001 5.18** 6.58** 8.33***
All specifications include state-specific trends, month dummies, and state fixed effects. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Errors are corrected for clustering on states.
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent.
21 This is also true when combining them into a single state MM variable.
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higher purities.
Turning to the heroin results, I again find that the federal MM is positive
and significant. In the full sample, the estimated coefficient of 8.7, when
compared to the average purity of 32, implies a percentage increase of 27 per
cent. For the street level sample, where the average purity is 17.8, the
estimated impact is a 30 per cent increase in purity. When using the full
sample, this rise is again smaller for states with pre-existing MMs. Although
the coefficient on the interaction is still negative when using the street-level
sample in column 5, I cannot reject the null that the increase is the same for
states with and without their own MMs. Unlike the cocaine regressions, states
instituting prior MMs generally have lower purity, again arguing against the
idea the early adopters were high purity states. Finally, unlike the cocaine
results, the estimates on Post-State MM is positive and significant in columns
5 and 6 suggesting that, as with the federal law, these state MMs raised
purity.
Since the time-variation in the purity of powder cocaine may be influenced
by the rise of crack cocaine, then one might be concerned that Fed MM is
merely reflecting this shift in the cocaine market. This would be the case if
crack attracted low-purity users, leaving only high purity, recreational cocaine
users in this market. However, it is unclear that the introduction of crack
would also attract low-purity heroin users. Furthermore, this does not explain
why these effects would differ by state according to pre-existing state-level
MMs. Unfortunately, I do not have access to crack data, one of the reasons I
include the crime index which, given the pattern of behavior for crack users,
should be correlated with crack use. Thus, while it is possible that the
magnitude of the Fed MM variable is impacted by an omitted crack effect, it is
unclear that the bias is necessarily positive or that the positive coefficient is
entirely driven by this omission.
Turning to the other controls, Agents and Budget are generally negative
and significant. Crime Index, Total Obs, and State Intensity tend to be positive
and significant. These first two might indicate that when the DEA has greater
manpower that it is able to target smaller dealers (arguing against the
contention that Federal MM is capturing a push by the DEA to target high-
purity dealers). These latter three are consistent with the notion that high
crime regions might attract greater law enforcement, increasing the incentive
to shift towards higher purities. Higher purities also tend to be found in states
with more Hispanics and fewer blacks. Purchased observations generally have
greater lower purity than seizures. The robustness of the other variables is
slight which is not surprising given the use of state fixed effects and state
specific time trends. 
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of cocaine and heroin. One natural concern is that this is capturing some in
drug markets over time not captured by the state-specific time trends or the
other variables. The significance of the interaction term helps to alleviate this.
Nevertheless, as an additional check on the impact of MMs, I also utilised the
international data available in the STRIDE database. There, I used these data
to estimate the effect of US federal MMs on observations in the STRIDE data
from other drug importing countries (i.e. the OECD countries).22 Since the
MMs are only effective for within the United States, their introduction should
have no effect on the purity of drugs in other countries. However, if the MM
dummy is simply capturing an overall shift in drug markets towards higher
purities, then it might well be significantly positive in these international
data. As shown in Table 5, where I also control for a common time trend and
country fixed effects, Federal MM is insignificant in the cocaine and
significantly negative in the heroin regressions. While there are many reasons
for why these observations may differ from those within the US, this adds
further evidence that this federal MM variable is capturing something other
than a simple positive change in the trend of drug purity. 
Table 5: US Mandatory Minimums and International Observations
(1) (2)
Cocaine Heroin








All specifications include country fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent.
In addition to the impact on average purity, MMs may affect other
moments of purity’s distribution. Figure 4 illustrates histograms for the purity
of observations under one gram before and after federal MMs. For both cocaine
and heroin, after 1987 there is a noticeable shift towards higher purities.
Furthermore, there is a clear increase in the dispersion of heroin purity.
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22 The countries used were Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Finland, Italy, Korea, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 
02 Davies_ESRI Vol 41-4  14/12/2010  11:16  Page 443Compared to their means, these changes in dispersion resulted in downward
trends in the CV of purity for both drugs as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.
There are reasons to think that these changes may be linked to the ADAA. On
the one hand, the ADAA may have led to a decentralisation of the drug
dilution process due to a desire to maintain purity further down the
distribution chain. This greater number of dealers diluting the drug could
increase the spread around the mean. Alternatively, the spread could fall. As
Table 1 indicates, the MM for a repeat offender is twice that of a comparable
first-time offender. As such, one would expect repeat offenders to shift more
towards purity in response to the MM.23As more dealers are apprehended and
become repeat offenders, this might reduce dispersion. Understanding these





Figure 4: Distribution of Purity for Observations Under One Gram
Source: STRIDE.
23 Unfortunately, data on the offender is not available from the STRIDE database.
02 Davies_ESRI Vol 41-4  14/12/2010  11:16  Page 444potential effects is important when examining the impact of purity on drug use
outcomes.
Table 6 therefore presents estimates using the annual state-level mean,
the coefficient of variation, and the skewness of purity.24 All of these were
constructed using only those observations with a quantity less than or equal
to one.25 The controls are the same as in Table 4, with the exception of
Purchase which is now the percentage of observations that were purchased for
each state-drug-year. Again, errors are clustered by state. Consistent with the
above results, the mean is greater following the introduction of the federal
MM for both cocaine and heroin. For cocaine, the federal MM is correlated
with a reduction in both the CV and skewness. These estimates suggest that
after 1987 the distribution of cocaine purity became less dispersed around its
higher mean and had a longer tail in low purities. For heroin, the federal law
has no impact on either the CV or skewness directly. However, the CV and
skewness rose after the federal MM took effect for states with prior MMs. This
would suggest greater dispersion and a longer high purity tail in these states.
In addition, similar to the federal law for cocaine, I now find a negative effect
on CV and skewness for states that added their own MMs after 1987. 
IV  PURITY AND EMERGENCY ROOM EPISODES
While recognition of the effect of MMs on purity is interesting in its own
right, it is worth asking what impacts this may have had. One effect, as noted
by the DEA (1999), is that readily available, highly-pure heroin is attracting
users unwilling to inject it. In addition, higher purities may make it more
difficult to break addiction. Another potential result from the shift in purity
concerns the need for users to seek medical attention. As Figures 2 and 3 show,
for the US as a whole the number of emergency room episodes (ER mentions
per 100 people) that mentioned cocaine or heroin use rose markedly during the
1990s. At the same time, the average purity of cocaine fell while that of heroin
rose (although both were significantly higher than they were before 1987).
Thus, at least the heroin numbers suggest that higher average purity levels
increase ER mentions. However, as Figures 2 and 3 show, there were other
marked changes in the distribution of purity. For cocaine, both the CV of
purity and the skewness of purity rose during the 1990s. For heroin, there was
relatively little change in these moments. Given the results in Table 6,
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24 I use annual aggregates here to match the analysis in the next section.
25 Comparable results were found when omitting zero purities in the construction of these
variables.
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Table 6: The Effect of MMs on the Distribution of Purity
Cocaine Heroin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean CV Skewness Mean CV Skewness
Federal MM  12.932*** –0.246** –0.684*** 6.442* –0.186 –0.197
(3.390) (0.114) (0.159) (3.781) (0.153) (0.225)
Prior State MM 1.361 0.075 0.246 –11.115* 0.399* 0.632*
*Federal MM (4.816) (0.152) (0.250) (5.565) (0.235) (0.330)
Prior State MM –5.704 0.093 –0.207 –5.124 0.023 –0.896
(9.243) (0.361) (0.526) (3.192) (0.945) (2.317)
Post State MM 1.491 –0.135 –0.189 7.213 –0.40*** –0.865***
Other controls:
Agents (3.222) (0.101) (0.151) (4.423) (0.113) (0.223)
–0.008*** 0.0001 0.0003** –0.005 0.001 0.001*
(0.003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.004) (0.0002) (0.000)
Budget 6.12e-08 –2.99e-09 –3.39e-09 –7.09e-8 –3.08e-09 –6.92e-09
(5.55e-8) (1.96e-9) (2.86e-9) (6.42e-8) (3.18e-9) (5.5e-9)
Crime Index 1.34e-10 –6e-12** –1e-11*** 1.06e-10 –9.e-12** –3e-11***
(9.35e-11) (3.1e-12) (4.5e-12) (9.2e-11) (3.9e-12) (8.9e-12)
Total Obs 0.002 –0.00002 –0.0001 –0.004 –.00001 0.001*
(0.001) (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.003) (0.0001) (0.000)
State Intensity 19.991 –0.189 –1.392 33.401 –1.953 –1.484
(46.287) (1.188) (3.295) (24.907) (1.205) (1.999)
Population –3.58e-17 1.50e-16 4.4e-16* –1.8e-15 1.86e-16 5.97e-16
(5.54e-15) (1.5e-16) (2.3e-16) (5.2e-15) (3e-16) (5.1e-16)
GSP 2.49e-12 –2.53e-12 –4.2e-12* 9.2e-11** –3.0e-12 –1.99e-12
(3.67e-11) (1.6e-12) (2.5e-12) (42 -11) (2e-12) (3.1e-12)
Income –4.32e-10 5.89e-11 7.93e-11 3.39e-10 4.46e-11 4.30e-12
(1.03e-09) (4.0e-11) (5.7e-11) (1.2e-09) (6e-11) (1.0e-10)
Poverty Rate –0.020 0.022* 0.021 0.290 –0.002 –0.004
(0.269) (0.012) (0.015) (0.473) (0.015) (0.021)
Unemployment 0.274 –0.002 0.018 1.261** –0.011 –0.012
Rate (0.535) (0.018) (0.027) (0.588) (0.019) (0.048)
% Male  –0.073 –0.005 0.009 0.477 0.023 0.001
(0.859) (0.024) (0.032) (0.660) (0.030) (0.059)
% Female  –0.277 0.006 0.013 –0.196 0.017 0.027
Household (0.233) (0.009) (0.012) (0.232) (0.011) (0.020)
% Hispanic  0.016 0.004 –0.012 1.106 –0.050* –0.101*
(0.525) (0.019) (0.022) (0.762) (0.028) (0.059)
% Black  –0.123 –0.020 –0.024 –0.731 0.004 –0.018
(0.499) (0.016) (0.023) (0.496) (0.019) (0.032)
% Other  –0.184 0.041 0.032 1.692** –0.026 –0.105**
Nonwhite (0.654) (0.032) (0.047) (0.635) (0.019) (0.052)
% Aged 0-17 1.044** –0.010 –0.054* 0.728 0.028 0.052
(0.478) (0.018) (0.029) (0.864) (0.030) (0.055)
02 Davies_ESRI Vol 41-4  14/12/2010  11:16  Page 446understanding how these moments relate to health outcomes gives insight
into the possible impacts of the federal MM.
Although one might expect drug users to reduce consumption in response
to higher expected purity, survey evidence by Darke, Hall and Ross (1996)
finds that this is rarely the case. Further, changes in the uncertainty about
purity, as embodied in the CV and skewness, can be more difficult to adjust
to.26 As described by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (2004b), the wide
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Table 6: The Effect of MMs on the Distribution of Purity (contd.)
Cocaine Heroin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean CV Skewness Mean CV Skewness
% Aged 18-24 0.609 –0.006 –0.035 –1.810* 0.071 0.111*
(0.591) (0.020) (0.028) (0.925) (0.042) (0.063)
% Aged 25-66 0.996 –0.021 –0.043 –0.447 0.039 0.018
(0.726) (0.024) (0.032) (0.749) (0.036) (0.066)
% High School 0.294 0.012 0.002 1.655** 0.002 0.033
(0.503) (0.020) (0.032) (0.805) (0.026) (0.050)
% Some College 0.424 0.012 0.013 1.297 –0.009 –0.002
(0.499) (0.020) (0.025) (0.843) (0.031) (0.057)
% College 0.018 0.007 –0.008 1.485* –0.013 –0.015
(0.557) (0.021) (0.026) (0.775) (0.031) (0.057)
% Post-graduate –1.139 0.042 0.032 –0.037 0.010 0.011
(1.034) (0.050) (0.066) (1.276) (0.049) (0.088)
Purchase 33.411*** –1.237*** –1.485*** 8.57*** –0.53*** –0.241
(3.117) (0.101) (0.164) (3.081) (0.098) (0.179)
Constant –47.368 0.433 0.527 –71.776 –4.312 –5.088
(78.365) (2.168) (3.397) (79.631) (3.053) (6.636)
Observations 1,099 1,055 1,050 754 725 717
R-squared 0.458 0.472 0.447 0.539 0.387 0.580
H0: Federal MM 
+ Prior State 
MM* Fed. 
MM = 0 9.13*** 1.31 3.22 .69 .85 .153
H0: Prior State 
MM = Post 
State MM  .52 .55 0.001 4.76** .20 0.001
All specifications include state-specific trends and state fixed effects. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Errors are corrected for clustering on states.
* significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent.
26 Within the medical literature, there is a body of evidence finding that the variations in average
purity have implications for overdose rates. For cocaine, Platt (1997) provids an overview. Risser,
et al. (2007) is a recent example for heroin.
02 Davies_ESRI Vol 41-4  14/12/2010  11:16  Page 447variation in street-level heroin purity is a primary reason for heroin overdoses.
Holding the number of users constant, a higher CV of purity may increase the
number of negative outcomes from use, increasing ER mentions. However, this
greater risk might lead to fewer users thereby lowering the number of ER
mentions. Similarly, a higher skewness (a longer tail in the higher purities)
might increase ER mentions since an unexpectedly high purity likely has more
severe health consequences than unexpectedly low purity. Alternatively, this
more “high end” uncertainty may frighten off users and lower ER mentions.
To investigate these possibilities, I utilise the DAWN’s dataset on
emergency room mentions for cocaine and heroin. This dataset reports the
number of ER mentions per 100,000 for the 21 Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs) listed in Table A2 of the Data Appendix. The time period used is 1990
to 2001. These data were used by Caulkins (2001), Hyatt and Rhodes (1995),
and Dave (2006) to estimate the effect of drug prices on mentions. Following
these studies, I use a reduced form specification where the number of ER
mentions per 100,000 for drug d in MSA m in year t is:
where Avgpriced,m,t is the average price per pure gram of the drug, Xm,t are
other MSA-specific controls, PureVarsd,m,t is a vector of purity variables for the
drug in question, Trendt is a linear trend, and εd,m,t is the error term. As in the
above studies, MSA controls include the percentage of an MSA’s hospitals
responding to the DAWN survey (Response Rate), a time trend, and real
income of the MSA. Unlike those studies, in some specifications I also control
for the average purity, the CV of purity, and the skewness of purity for a given
drug, MSA, year observation. The average price and the three purity variables
were all constructed using observations with quantities less than one gram.27
The purity variables were calculated using all the observations; those for
average price per pure gram utilised only purchased observations. Summary
statistics for the data used in these regressions are in Table A3 of the Data
Appendix. This specification is estimated separately for cocaine and heroin.
Table 7 presents the results for total ER mentions; columns 1 through 3
are for cocaine, 4 through 6 are for heroin.28 Column 1 presents a baseline
448 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
ERd,m,t d,m,t d,m,t d,m,t =α 0 +α 1Avg.price +α 2Xm,t +α 3 PureVars +α 4Trendt+ε
27 This differs from Dave (2006) who uses observations of 40 grams or less. I use this smaller
amount due to Horowitz’s (2001) observation that most retail sales involve smaller amounts of
around one gram. Also, due to missing data for some MSA’s, rather than use Dave’s approach of
substituting statewide data, I drop this MSA-year. If such replacements are made, similar results
are obtained.
28 In unreported results, I also used the heroin variables as controls in the cocaine regressions and
vice versa to test for substitution between drugs. Some evidence for this was found. Results are
available on request.
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only the average price, a trend, real income, and the response rate. Consistent
with those studies, I find a negative and significant coefficient for the average
price. This would be consistent with higher prices reducing use and, therefore,
the need for medical attention. Column 2 adds average purity, the CV, and
skewness to the baseline specification. I find that higher average purity
implies fewer ER mentions. This would be consistent with higher average
purity implying fewer harmful adulterants, reducing the risk of use. During
the 1990s, the average cocaine purity fell by 9.3 percentage points. This would
translate into 399 more ER mentions, a 7.6 per cent increase relative to the
sample mean.29 Higher CV, on the other hand, significantly increases cocaine
ER mentions as one would expect if uncertainty is a risk for users. Using the
.1 increase in CV during the 1990s, this implies 516 more mentions, or a 9.9
per cent increase relative to the mean. Higher skewness implies significantly
fewer ER mentions. This suggests that more positively skewed distributions
deter usage and reduce ER mentions. Using the .21 skewness increase during
the 1990s, this would translate to 386 fewer mentions, or a drop of 7.3 per cent
relative to the mean. In column 3, I also introduce MSA fixed effects. Of the
key variables, although the signs of the estimated coefficients remain the
same, only the skewness coefficient remains significant. 
Columns 4 through 6 repeat this analysis for heroin. The pattern and
significance of the coefficients matches that for cocaine with the exception that
average purity, although still negative, is never significant. Again using the
changes during the 1990s, the fall in CV of .13 implies a reduction in mentions
of 289, or a fall of 12 per cent relative to the mean. The decline in skewness of
.56, on the other hand, implies an increase in mentions of 766, a rise of 31 per
cent relative to the mean.
In addition to considering the changes during the sample period, one can
estimate the impact of the federal MM on ER mentions. Using the estimates
of Table 6 and columns 2 and 5 of Table 7, the net impact of the federal MM
would be a reduction in cocaine mentions of 560 and a reduction in heroin
mentions of 175. Unfortunately, due to lack of data, this cannot be compared
to the actual change in mentions following the introduction of the federal law.
Nevertheless, it suggests that one potential benefit of the ADAA could have
been a reduction in ER visits by users.
Finally, Table 8 uses additional data from the DAWN that describe the
outcome of the ER mentions as well as the reason the patient sought help,
assuming that these were known. These more detailed data are available only
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29 In this and all comparable subsequent calculations, this is the number of cases per 100,000.
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for 1995 to 2001.30 To my knowledge, these data have yet to be used by
economists.31 I report the results for three items: deaths per 100,000,
overdoses per 100,000, and the number of complaints of unexpected reaction
per 100,000. The controls are the same as columns 2 and 5 above. 
Across the specifications, two findings are fairly robust. First, the
estimated signs of the coefficients are comparable to those for total ER
mentions, i.e. lower prices, higher purity, lower CV and higher skewness all
reduce these outcomes. Second, the coefficients for CV and skewness are
generally the most significant. The exception to this is death from heroin use.
One potential explanation for this difference between heroin and cocaine
deaths is that long-term cocaine users become more sensitive to the drug’s
anaesthetic and convulsant effects which are linked to the primary causes of
death from cocaine use (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2004a). Users of
opiates such as heroin, however, do not exhibit an increased probability of
death after continued use. In any case, these results suggest that changes in
the distribution of purity have important effects on specific drug use outcomes
as well as the total number of ER mentions. Again using the results from Table
6, these estimates suggest that following the ADAA there would be 5 fewer
cocaine deaths, 1 fewer heroin death, 200 fewer cocaine overdoses, 33 fewer
heroin overdoses, 560 fewer cocaine unexpected reactions, and 86 fewer heroin
unexpected reactions.
V CONCLUSION
The goals of this paper have been threefold. First, it estimated the impact
of federal MM sentences that are based on gross quantity on the purity of
cocaine and heroin. For a variety of specifications, the data indicates that
there was a significant rise in drug purity following the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.
Second, I find that the introduction of this law impacted other moments of
purity’s distribution. Third, I show that changes in these moments impact the
health outcomes of use, indicating a net health benefit from the ADAA. To the
extent that Irish criminal law feeds into uncertainty over drug purity, these
lessons from the US data provide useful information in fine tuning the Irish
approach to illegal drugs.
30 When controlling for MSA fixed effects, coefficients from these specifications were rarely
significant. This is likely due to the shorter time series for which these detailed outcomes are
available.
31 Examples in the medical literature include Risser et al. (2007) who estimate the impact of
average heroin purity on heroin deaths.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































02 Davies_ESRI Vol 41-4  14/12/2010  11:16  Page 452In closing, it is worth recognising the caveats of this study. First, it does
not estimate the impact of this law on drug use.32 Second, as with all studies
on drug policy, it must be remembered that the data may not be random. If,
for example, the timing of the ADAA coincided with a shift in DEA efforts
towards high purity dealers in states without their own MMs, the results
would represent an upper bound on the impact of MMs. Third, this paper
focuses on federal MMs. Beyond this policy, there are a variety of federal and
local enforcement measures that I do not directly consider. Fourth, I only
consider the cocaine and heroin markets. It is likely that similar changes have
occurred for other drugs.33 Finally, it is likely that purity changes have
impacted other outcomes from drug use besides ER mentions. Given the large
expenditures on interdiction, incarceration, and dealing with the impacts of
drug use, these topics clearly warrant further attention by researchers.
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Four variables capture federal and state-specific law enforcement. Budget
is the DEA’s budget measured in 2000 dollars. Agents is the number of special
agents employed by the DEA. These data are from the DEA’s website.34 One
possibility is that all of these are positively correlated with purity since they
are positively related to the probability of arrest. Alternatively, with more
agents the DEA may be able to target more low-level dealers, leading to a drop
in purity. I also include the total number of observations for a given drug (Total
Obs) in a given year as a proxy of overall enforcement. At the state level, I
include the share of a particular drug’s observations in a given state in a given
year (State Intensity). All else equal, greater relative interdiction efforts in a
given location will increase its share of the total observations. Therefore, I
expect this too to be positively correlated with purity. As a measure of the
overall crime level in a state, I include the FBI’s Crime Index, which reports
the number of crimes in a state-year per 100,000 people. If more crime leads
to greater enforcement overall, purity should rise.
I include a number of state-level economic controls.35 Economic controls
include real gross state product (GSP) and real per-capita personal income
(Income), both from the BEA.36 I also include the percentage of the population
below the poverty line from the Current Population Survey (Poverty Rate) and
the unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Unemployment
Rate). My expectations are that states with high incomes and strong
economies will have consumers who demand a purer product. Alternatively,
states with low incomes may have more users who demand higher purity.
Finally, I include several demographic variables. Population, obtained
from the BEA, controls for state size. I include three measures of ethnicity: the
percentage of blacks aged sixteen and over (% Black), the percentage of
Hispanics aged sixteen and over (% Hispanic), and the percentage of other
nonwhites aged sixteen and over (% Other Nonwhite). Likewise, three age
categories were included: % Aged 0-17, % Aged 18-24, and % Aged 25-66. Four
education categories were included, one for high school graduates (% High
School), one for some college (% Some College), one for four-year college
graduates (% College), and one for some post-graduate education (% Post-
graduate). These measure the percentage of the population for whom this is
their maximum educational attainment. The percentage of the population that
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34 At the time of this writing, this was http://www.dea.gov.
35 Although markets are likely segmented within a state, due to data availability I use state-level
controls.
36 These were converted into $2,000 by respectively using the GDP and personal income price
deflators from the BEA.
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Female Household) were also included. All of these demographic variables
were obtained from the Current Population Survey. I expect frequent drug
users to demand a purer product, therefore, I expect higher purities in young,
uneducated populations with large numbers of minorities and males.
Table A1: Summary Statistics for Mandatory Minimum Data
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Source
Cocaine
Purity 32,5129 59.09195 31.73785 0 100 STRIDE
Total Obs 32,5129 1628.509 1844.025 1 7213 STRIDE
State Intensity 32,5129 .1020586 .1036161 .0000576 .3628664 STRIDE
Purchase 32,5129 .3313977 .4707164 0 1 STRIDE
Heroin
Purity 10,3568 32.0208 31.68088 0 100 STRIDE
Total Obs 10,3568 636.8365 588.127 1 2056 STRIDE
State Intensity 10,3568 .1438392 .1271989 .0001513 .4488623 STRIDE
Purchase 10,3568 .3666383 .4818889 0 1 STRIDE
State Controls
Population 32,5129 7.86e+15 8.17e+15 3.97e+14 3.45e+16 BEA
GSP 32,5129 2.42e+11 2.57e+11 7.87e+09 1.33e+12 BEA
Income 32,5129 2.69e+10 5.61e+09 1.34e+10 4.15e+10 BEA
Agents 32,5129 3391.672 858.2553 1896 4601 DEA
Budget 32,5129 1.01e+08 3.91e+07 3.71e+07 1.66e+08 DEA
% Hispanic 32,5129 8.359309 8.033461 0 38.93061 CPS
% Black 32,5129 25.01394 23.36371 0 73.07587 CPS
% Aged 0-17 32,5129 25.38686 2.870793 14.35 39.13191 CPS
% Aged 18-24 32,5129 10.52062 1.637008 5.636529 17.36039 CPS
% Aged 25-66 32,5129 53.6531 2.597042 41.26107 61.75636 CPS
% Male 32,5129 48.32879 1.193399 43.67656 53.28239 CPS
%Female Hhold 32,5129 40.37764 9.637782 12.76664 59.65788 CPS
% High School 32,5129 23.8879 3.595519 16.39168 34.96463 CPS
%Some College 32,5129 21.03816 4.369682 11.82579 32.98914 CPS
% College 32,5129 6.256339 6.15396 0 19.01145 CPS
% Post-grad. 32,5129 7.274683 3.579499 1.564506 16.62609 CPS
Poverty Rate 32,5129 14.36207 4.183938 2.566354 29.11244 CPS
Unemp. Rate 32,5129 6.271926 1.820097 2.2 18 BLS
Crime Index 32,5129 5.15e+10 5.14e+10 1.47e+09 2.06e+11 FBI
Post State MM 32,5129 .4185846 .4933278 0 1 Author
Prior State MM 32,5129 .1179624 .3225641 0 1 Author
Federal MM 32,5129 .7772146 .4161161 0 1 Author
% Other  32,5129 3.431657 5.378414 0 75.59312 CPS
Nonwhite
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Atlanta Baltimore Boston Buffalo
Chicago Dallas Denver Detroit
LA Miami Minneapolis/St. Paul New Orleans
New York Newark Philadelphia Phoenix
St. Louis San Diego San Francisco Seattle
Washington DC
Table A3: Summary Statistics for Overdose Data
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Source
Cocaine
Avg. Price 160 354.4035 1309.717 0 9911.516 STRIDE
Avg. Purity 160 40.64239 17.99777 6.75 84.66666 STRIDE
CV Purity 160 .2499911 .1502309 .0072775 .7001955 STRIDE
Skewness 160 –.7754869 .8708849 –3.173983 .9541013 STRIDE
of Purity
Total Mentions 160 5223.219 4939.927 468.3386 21592.34 DAWN
Deaths 74 6.959459 6.976358 0 29 DAWN
Overdoses 97 648.5361 487.4206 43 2409 DAWN
Un. Reaction 97 1120.567 1306.197 94 5158 DAWN
Heroin
Avg. Price 170 1851.956 5738.329 23.08582 49988.34 STRIDE
Avg. Purity 170 29.21436 14.85899 1.044444 77.75 STRIDE
CV Purity 170 .518565 .3222561 .0103227 1.709519 STRIDE
Skewness of 170 .2774909 .9451136 –1.817437 2.908206 STRIDE
Purity
Total Mentions 170 2451.05 2684.242 53.17404 11332.14 DAWN
Deaths 76 9.236842 8.921687 0 37 DAWN
Overdoses 94 489.0851 383.8957 22 1569 DAWN
Un. Reaction 93 320.4731 456.9628 3 2794 DAWN
MSA controls
Real Income  170 29853.74 4320.606 20472.13 41291 DAWN
Response Rate 170 80.27118 9.237654 44.4 100 Census
Sources:
STRIDE: System to Retrieve Drug Evidence.
DAWN: Drug Abuse Warning Network (http://dawninfo.samhsa.gov).
BLS: Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov).
CPS: Current Population Survey (http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/cpsmain.htm).
Census: US Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov).
DEA: Drug Enforcement Agency (http://www.dea.gov).
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation (http://www.fbi.gov).
BJA: Bureau of Justice Assistance (1996).
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